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The  decision  oriented  theory  of  the  public  firm  (Feng, Friedrich 2013) becomes 
extended. The authors consider that sometimes public firms compete horizontally 
as  well.  This  can  be  due  to  competition  among  the  public  owners  (e.g. 
municipalities) considering location choices  for public firms they own, or public 
firms competing against each other. We mention some results related to the first type 
of  competition  and  we  refer  to  how  the  literature  on  location  choices  under 
oligopolic  conditions  could  be  referred  to  within  the  framework  of  our  basic 
approach. One approach by Cornes and Hartley (2001) also allows modelling the 
establishment of joint ventures and their location choices. The basic model of the 
public firm is used to provide insight into the location choices of a trust of public 
firms.  The  trust  exhibits  coordination  at  three  levels  via  the  politically-oriented 
decision-making body of the public owner, the trust’s headquarters and subsidiary 
public  firms.  The  resulting  model  illustrates  the  interplay  of  different  decision-
makers and the effects of the coordinating activities. The first attempts to formulate 
a public firm decision-making oriented location theory exist.  
 
Keywords:  location  theory,  public  firm  theory,  industrial  location  theory, 
competition among public firms, principal agent, trust of public firms 
 




The theory of public firm developed on the basis of a public firm theory (Feng, 
Friedrich  2013)  concentrated  on  locational  choice  of  one  public  enterprise  and 
vertical  co-ordination  by  its  owner.  However,  the  location  choices  are  also 
influenced  through  competition  and  co-ordination  with  other  public  enterprises. 
These  firms  may  have  different  public  owners,  e.g.  municipalities,  or  may  be 
subsidiaries  of  a  trust  of  public  firms.  How  the  decision  oriented  public  firm 
location theory and competition theory concerning public firms can be linked to 
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location theory of a public firm is shown in this article
4. The research task concerns 
how  location  decisions  of  public  firms  get  coordinated  and  is  influenced  by 
horizontal competition. This task leads to the following questions: 
•  How can models of horizontal competition among public firms and owners of 
public firms be extended to location theory? 
•  How to integrate the location theory of one public firm into the horizontal and 
vertical co-ordination within a trust of public firms? 
 
The competition theories and related location theories are not repeated in this article 
in detail. They are offered in literature. Here the relation between location theory 
and the decision oriented theory of one public firm is stressed 
 
The  authors  devote  the  second  section  to  the  incorporation  of the  theory  of  the 
public  firm  into  location  theory  approaches  or  of  competition  theory  into  some 
approaches of public office location theory. A model Location model of a public 
trust follows in the third section. Some hints for further development of this kind of 
location theory of public firms follows in the conclusive section. 
 
II. Public firms in horizontal competition 
 
A competitive localization situation exists if municipalities compete on the basis of 
the establishment of municipal firms (e.g. wellness swimming pools, convention 
halls). This can be formulated as a game where two municipalities are the players, 
and the municipalities have gains (F) or losses to be avoided or votes. The strategies 
can be locations. The payoff at the location may result from our model above or in 
the case of votes by applying the extended Pelzman model (Feng, Friedrich 2013). 
However, if the public firms themselves compete as well, the payoff is additionally 
determined by a duopoly solution embedded in the model above (Friedrich 1988). 
For each pair of locations, the solution above is determined at a given price (solution 
above)  for  the  competitor.  Following  this  assumption  a  Launhardt-Hotelling 
solution i s  e l a b o r a t e d  t o  y i e l d  t h e  p a y o f f s .  T h e r e  c a n  b e  s everal  solutions  in 
dominant  strategies,  equilibrium  points,  absolute  equilibrium  points,  and  so  on 
(Friedrich, 1976 pp. 237 and 287). The solutions for the duopolies and municipal 
competition provides other results such as employment, prices, outputs, votes, use of 
land, and so on, and different payoff matrices result. If the municipal firms export to 
another municipality as well, positive payoffs may lead to a movement of location in 
the direction of the city limit between the two municipalities. If the policy is to 
prevent  losses,  the  locations  tend  to  move  in  the  opposite  direction.  If  both 
municipalities  use  simple  indicators,  such  as  jobs  as payoffs, they  are in severe 
conflict. The conflict may reduce if the payoffs are different or more sophisticated 
resulting from a utility analysis including several goals. 
 
This is obvious in the case of attracting a public firm of a non-municipal public body 
(e.g.  a  federal  or  provincial  firm)  or  if  such  a  firm  is  considering  a  move  to  a 
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competing municipality. In the first and the second case, a game can be formulated, 
where the strategies are locations offered to the firm or its public decision-maker, 
where  the  public  decision-maker  chooses  a  location  according  to  its  preferences 
among the locations offered and where payoffs consequently result. The individual 
payoffs can be delineated using the model above or through other information. If 
both players use simple indicators such as jobs, a constant sum game or a zero-sum 
game in the case of a resettlement can result. Then this may lead to a minimax 
solution in terms of location. That is also true if, in both cities, the same parties 
govern the city, and they expect to strengthen their power through the settlement 
(e.g. immigration of additional party members). However, if the local governments 
in one of the cities fear an influx of inhabitants that will not vote for the ruling party, 
this city will not be interested in the settlement of the public firm. The payoffs in the 
game change totally, and this city offers no location to the public firm or a very 
unfavourable one; therefore, leaving the settlement to the competitor.  
 
If there is political competition between the two parties in a community to form the 
local government by offering locations, and if there are three different groups of 
voters, a vote paradox (Mueller 2002) may occur. Under these circumstances, the 
party which offers the voters first looses votes because the opposite party always 
finds an alternative location to beat the political competitor. Therefore, the resulting 
location is determined by the sequence of location campaigns. 
 
Sometimes several municipalities want to establish a joint public firm. They expect 
positive payoffs particularly if the common location is chosen within their territory. 
If there are three municipalities with equal decision-making strength (e.g. through 
size, population, voters, financial means) the high school problem results (Isard, 
Smith, Isard, Tung, Dacey 1986). Two of the municipalities may form a coalition so 
as  to  locate  the  public  firm  near  these  two  municipalities.  However,  the  third 
municipality may destroy the coalition by offering to form a new coalition with one 
of the decision-makers. In this case, the decision-maker  who  was  excluded  may 
disrupt this coalition by making a counter offer. The coalition process creates a 
cycle and a rule must exist to stop the negotiations in order to find a location (e.g. a 
location near all three municipalities). 
 
Another  extension  of  an  approach  developed  by  Cornes  and  Hartley  (2001) 
makes it possible to determine the number of municipalities joining in the formation 
of a public enterprise at different possible locations. If we consider the total sum of 
resources needed at location “a” using Xa, we can name the share of municipality i 
using  xia/Σxja.  The  utility  gains  cia f r o m  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  f i r m ,  
increasing with the growing share of municipality i in Ea, where the dis-utilities bia 
are  related  to  its  share
5.  An  optimal  share  function  is  determined  for  each 
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municipality.  As the sum of all shares must achieve 1, we can add all the share 
functions to a total function. Where this function equals 1, we find a solution and 
determine the number of municipalities engaged in the cooperation (c.f. Figure 10). 
If the utility wi becomes larger than the added share, the function gets less steep and 
moves to the right. That means there will be less municipalities joining the public 
firm; however, the utility of the participating towns and the total investment sum 
turns out to be higher if a more costly firm and location is chosen. The same is true 
if the opportunity costs of finance shrink. The opposite development occurs if the 
utilities  of  the  municipalities  decrease  or  opportunity  costs  of  finance  increase. 
These models are more useful for explaining which location is chosen and which 
communities  cooperate.  However  it  does  not  help  identify  the  most  desirable 
location from the point of view of society.  There  must be an additional welfare 
function to detect the optimal social location for public firms from the different 
locations achieved from evaluations of the municipalities involved. Then vertical 
evaluation and an element of competition is introduced.  
  
Other models refer to identifying a location for hazardous facilities, where such a 
function  is  introduced  by  requiring  efficient  –  mostly  cost  minimal  sites.  The 
externalities extend beyond the border of the community selected as a site. A pattern 
of compensation payments among the communities allowing a location is developed 
(Waehrer 2003). For some  models, it is assumed, as in public facilities location 
theory, that costs should be minimized. The costs for locations within a community 
are possessed by the community. The costs associated with a location outside the 
community border are considered public information. Cost minimal locations are to 
be  determined  (Kunreuther,  Kleindorfer  1986;  Kunreuther,  Kleindorfer,  Knez, 
Yasick 1987). When considering the negative effects of a site, the tendency of a 
community prevails to locate the facility near the border (Ingberman 1995). Cross-
border effects can also be considered (Richardson, Kunreuther, 1993) where external 
effects occur in non-neighbouring municipalities as well. Some authors (Armstrong, 
1996; Bernheim, Whinston 1986; MCAfee, McMillan 1988; McAfee, McMillan, 
Whinston 1989; Rochet, Choné 1998; Jehiel, Moldevanu 1996; Frey, Oberholzer-
Gee  1996;  Frey  F.  Oberholzer-Gee,  Eichenberger  1996;  Jehiel,  Moldovanu, 
Stacchetti  1999;  Williams  1999)  develop  or  discuss  mechanisms  to  compensate 
decision-makers involved in such a way that a cost  minimal  site  is  going  to  be 
chosen. There are other mechanisms that are directly related to public firms and 
concern  investment  (Friedrich  1969,  1976),  or  are  debated  in  the  literature  on 
participating in private public partnerships (Grimsey, Lewis 2004) or the literature 
on built up growth pools and clusters in transformation processes (Friedrich, Feng 
1998). The location problem for public firms is embedded in two ways. There are 
municipalities competing horizontally for or against a location. The cost functions 
dealt with in the models may be interpreted as the difference between turnover and 
cost, net-benefits, utilities and political returns (votes), thus making it possible to 
introduce the location problem as discussed here. 
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Figure 10. Share function solution for location a (compiled by the authors). 
 
The problem is that most of these contributions try to prove that there are siting 
policies and compensation schemes that can determine optimal locations (Waehrer 
2003);  however,  they  do  not  come  up  with  rules  that c a n  b e  a p p l i e d  i n  r e a l  
situations. There are many additional legal and economic restrictions that do not 
allow  for  compensations  (i.e.  gifts  among  municipalities  and  horizontal  fiscal 
equalization  among  municipalities  are  not  allowed), a n d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  e x i s t  i n  
organizing  and  participating  in  auctions  etc.  Moreover,  most  of  these  models 
consider a mix of vertical and horizontal competition between municipalities. 
 
III. Location model for a trust of public firms 
 
The interaction between vertical and horizontal factors of competition as well as 
economic and political factors with respect to selecting a location for public firms is 
demonstrated using a three-level model. It consists of public firms at the bottom 
belonging to a public trust. There is public firm j in region j. The firms are co-
coordinated  financially  by  the  headquarters  of  the  public  trust t h a t  r e c e i v e s  
financial means for investment through the public owner (e.g. ministry of finance 
of  a  government).  Voters l i v e  i n  r e g i o n  j  o n  w h o s e  v o t i n g  b e h a v i o u r  t h e  
government depends. Voters are sensitive to the output of firm j and the financing of 
budget D. The size of fixed capital Aj (sj1, sj2) for firm j equals budget Dj to cover 
fixed costs KFj. The fixed costs also depend on the location sj1, sj2 of the public firm. 
We assume a production function (10) in Table 1, where the production depends on 
Aj and on Labour Lj and on material Cj. Then there is a demand function (11) and 
the self-financing of the variable costs (equation (12)). The utility of management 
depends on output Xj and labour Lj (equation (13)). The maximization of the utility 
of management under the restriction of the self-financing of variable costs (14) 
yields first order conditions referring to directions 1 and 2. The indifference curves 
for the management are shown in Figure 11.  
 
Xia/Xa 
xia/Xa = 1 – ( bia / cia) * Xa 
Xa 
Σ xia/Xa = n –Xa Σ bia / cia 1,…n 
1 
Xa  2 4




        I n d i f f e r e n c e   c u r v e s   o f  
        u t i l i t y   o f   m a n a g e m e n t  
     O p t i m a l    U j 









         L o c a t i o n   i n d e x   s j1   
Figure 11. Optimal location of one public firm belonging to the trust (compiled by 
the authors). 
 
The relation of the marginal changes to fixed costs by location variations in different 
directions equals the proportion of the subsequent differences. They comprise the 
variation in wage costs minus the variation in production volume multiplied by the 
marginal turnover. This is equivalent to the rule that the rate of marginal utilities 
by moving equals the proportion of marginal gross profits
6.   
 
The relation mentioned above also exists if the location is given and optimal output 
is determined. The proportion of marginal utilities to factor variations equals the 
proportion of marginal gross profits. The implied relation between input Cj and L is 
shown in (14.2) as are the terms for C and L. The optimal solution for Output X, is 
shown in (14.3) and the relation between Xj and the fixed factor Aj (fixed costs KFj 
and budget Dj) is demonstrated in Figure 12. Equation (14.4) derives the utility of 
management at a given location. 
 
            Output Xj 
 
          2   ( a j/3):bj 
         
         








  ( b j⋅i⋅w):(a/3)
3         F i x e d   f a c t o r   A j   
Figure 12. Development of the output if the fixed factor is varied (compiled by the 
authors). 
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Table 1. Equations concerning public firm j (=1,2) 
 
(10)  Production function     
  X j = A j(sj1,sj2)⋅Lj⋅Cj, 
while  Aj(sj1,sj2) = KFj = Dj 
.with  sj1,sj2 – location index 
Dj – Budget to cover fix costs 
(11)  Price–demand function     
  Pj =a j−bj⋅Xj =a j −bj⋅Aj⋅Lj⋅Cj  .with  aj,bj – parameters of price–
demand function 
(12)  Self–financing of variable costs     
  w j(sj1,sj2)⋅Lj+i⋅Cj = Pj⋅Xj  .with  wj – wage dependent on location 
(13)  Utility of management     
  U j = Lj⋅X j  .   
(14)  Utility maximization 
Max!  U j = Lj⋅X j = Aj⋅L
2
j⋅Cj, while (aj−bj⋅Aj⋅Lj⋅Cj)⋅Aj⋅Lj⋅Cj = w j⋅Lj+i⋅Cj; 
 L a g r a n g e – F u n c t i o n :  
L= Aj⋅Lj
2 ⋅Cj+λ⋅[(a j−bj⋅Aj⋅Lj⋅Cj)⋅Aj⋅Lj⋅Cj−wj⋅Lj −i⋅Cj] 






(∂wj /∂sj1)−(∂Aj /∂sj1)⋅(a j −2⋅bj⋅Aj⋅Lj⋅Cj)⋅Cj
(∂wj /∂sj2)−(∂Aj /∂sj2)⋅(a j −2⋅bj⋅Aj⋅Lj⋅Cj)⋅Cj
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Public firms in region j are co-coordinated by a trust headquarters (c.f. Table 2). 
The headquarters maximizes its utility by allocating total budget D to finance fixed 
costs KFj, which are expressed by Aj (sj1, sj2) and are equal to Dj – Dj adds up to total 
budget D (equation 16). The utility of the trust of publ i c  f i r m s i s  l i nk e d t o t he   2 6
outputs of the public firms. The parameters characterizing the headquarters are not 
directly  location  dependent.  Through  the  output  of  the  public  firms,  the  budget 
allocation  solution  for  the  headquarters  depends  indirectly  on  the  selection  of  a 
location for the public firms. The resulting budget split is shown in equations (17) 
and (18) in Table 2 and graphically depicted in Figure 13. 
 
Table 2. Equations related to the headquarter of the public firms trust 
  
(15) Utility 
  W = αj⋅X j j=1
2 ∑  with αj: evaluation parameter of output of public firm j 
(16) Total budget 
  D= Dj j=1
2 ∑ = KAj =
j=1
2 ∑ Aj j=1
2 ∑  
(17) Utility maximization 
Max!  W = αj⋅X j j=1
2 ∑ , while  D= Aj j=1
2 ∑ , 
X j =[aj /3+ (aj /3 )
2 −bj⋅(i⋅w j /A j)/(aj /3 )]/bj; 
Lagrange–Function:  L= αj⋅Xj j=1
2 ∑ +λ⋅(D− Aj j=1
2 ∑ ) 
∂L/∂Aj =αj⋅XAj
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The  owner  government  of  the  public  trust  maximizes  votes.  In  this  way  it 
establishes an optimal total budget (Table 3, and equations (19), (20), (21), Figure 
14), which is determined by: 
•  Features of the production functions  
•  Features of the demand functions   2 7
•  Preferences of the utility functions of the management of public firms, and of 
the management of the headquarters 
•  Vote maximization of the owner government 
•  Voter preferences and voting behaviour 
•  Factor prices 
•  Location dependence of voters and of the fixed costs of the public firms 
 
                        Budget D1=A1 





               O p t i m a l   b u d g e t   a l l o c a t i o n  
 
 
                    B u d g e t   r e s t r i c t i o n   D = D 1+D2 
                  
 
 
                              
  O u t p u t   X 1          Production possibility               Budget D2=A2      





  P r o d u c t i o n   e x p a n s i o n                                          O u t p u t  X2 dependent on budget D2 
  r e l a t e d   t o   t h e   o p t i m a l    I n d i f f e r e n c e    
        b u d g e t   a l l o c a t i o n                c u r v e s   o f   u t i l i t y  
                   W = α1⋅X1+α2⋅X2 
 
 
               O u t p u t   X 2 
 
Figure 13. Allocation of budgets by the trust headquarters (compiled by the 
authors). 
 
The  optimal  budget  and  implicitly  the  optimal  locations  are  shown  in  Table  3. 
When  concentrating  on  location-dependent  fixed  costs,  the  basic  proposals 
mentioned above hold for a public firm. When we emphasize changes in distance 
depending  votes,  the  solutions  change.  Through  location-dependent  votes,  the 
solution is pulled to points of high vote sensitivity. The following propositions with 
respect to public firm 1, result.    
 
(1) If no voters sensitivity changes: 
The marginal changes due to production and budget adjustments are the same in 
either direction (c.f. Table 3: the third and fourth term in equation (21)). 
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Table 3. Equations concerning the public trust in the public owner 
 
(19) Votes area     
  V = Vj j=1
2 ∑ , while 
Vj =βXj(sj1,sj2)⋅X j −βDj(sj1,sj2)⋅D 
.with  Vj: Votes in region j 
βX: output dependent voting 
βD: budget dependent voting 
(20) Maximization of Votes 
Max!  V = Vj j=1
2 ∑ = (βXj⋅Xj−βDj⋅D)
j=1
2 ∑ , while  D= Dj j=1
2 ∑ = Aj j=1


















































2 ∑ ]= βDj j=1
2 ∑  and D= Aj j=1
2 ∑  























































Marginal variation of votes: 


























- because of budget adjustments 
 
(2) If only location output sensitive votes change: 
Marginal changes in votes due to production and budget adjustments as  well  as 
votes changes due to marginal output votes and the resulting adjustments being the 
same in each direction.  
 
(3) If budget and output sensitive votes change:  2 9
Marginal changes in votes induced by the sensitivity  changes  as  well  as  due  to 
output and budget changes having to be equal in all directions. 
 
The same is true for public firm 2. 
 
Thus a theory of public firm location is formulated by integrating several of the 
location theories mentioned earlier. The vote maximal budget is shown in Figure 
14. The vote maximal total results when the marginal increase in output dependent 
votes absolutely equals the marginal decrease in budget dependent votes. 
 
       Votes V=V1+V2 
 





            V = βX1⋅X1+βX2⋅X2–(βD1+βD2)⋅D 
 
                   M a x i m a l  
                   v o t e s    βX1⋅X2           ( βD1+βD2)⋅D 
 









                  B u d g e t   D = D 1+D2   
Figure 14. Vote maximal total budget (compiled by the authors). 
 
IV. Conclusions and further research development  
 
The  decision  oriented  theory  of  the  public  firm  (Feng, Friedrich 2013) becomes 
extended. The authors consider that sometimes public firms compete horizontally 
as  well.  This  can  be  due  to  competition  among  the  public  owners  (e.g. 
municipalities) considering location choices  for public firms they own, or public 
firms competing against each other. We mention some results related to the first type 
of  competition  and  we  refer  to  how  the  literature  on  location  choices  under 
oligopolic  conditions  could  be  referred  to  within  the  framework  of  our  basic 
approach. One approach by Cornes and Hartley (2001) also allows modelling the 
establishment of joint ventures and their location choices. 
  3 0
The  basic  model  of  the  public  firm  is  used  to  provide  insight into  the  location 
choices of a trust of public firms. The trust exhibits coordination at three levels via 
the  politically-oriented  decision-making  body  of  the  public  owner,  the  trust’s 
headquarters  and  subsidiary  public  firms.  The  resulting  model  illustrates  the 
interplay of different decision-makers and the effects of the coordinating activities. 
The  first  attempts  to  formulate  a  public  firm  decision-making  oriented  location 
theory exist.  
 
The microeconomic public firm trust location model and location theories provided 
can be extended in various ways: 
•  More public firms, different types of public firms and several trusts can also be 
introduced; 
•  More competitive parameters of actions could be considered for public firms; 
•  Different  market  forms  and  private-public  competition  among  firms  can  be 
integrated; 
•  Different  vote  functions  for  federal,  state  and  local  governments  should  be 
introduced; 
•  Competition among governments on one side and their public firms could be 
involved (Lindemann 1999); 
•  A  set  of  horizontal  and  vertical  competition  models t o  e x p l a i n  a n d  p r e d i c t  
competition for investor settlement (in China), developed by Feng (2005), could 
be linked to these approaches; 
•  Other  location  theories  concerning  growth,  development,  growth  pole  and 
cluster theory and infrastructure theories, could be adapted for the purposes of 
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In Europa gibt es mehrere Konzerne öffentlicher Unternehmen. In einem Beitrag zur 
Standorttheorie  öffentlicher  Unternehmen  –  siehe  Standorttheorie  öffentlicher 
Unternehmen  im  Band:  Estnische  Gespräche  über  Wirtschaftspolitik: 
Wirtschaftspolitische Theorie und Praxis in der Europäischen Union, 2013, Nr.1, 
„Grundlegende  Ansätze  zur  Standortheorie  eines  öffentlichen  Unternehmens“  – 
haben  die  Autoren  auf  die  mannigfaltigen  Standortfaktoren  öffentlicher 
Unternehmen  verwiesen  und  Standorttheorien  für  öffentliche  Unternehmen 
diskutiert  und  entwickelt.  Die  Standortfaktoren  beinhalten  ökonomische, 
betriebswirtschaftliche,  geographische,  planerische  Gegebenheiten,  welche  die 
öffentlichen  Unternehmen  und  ihre  Umwelt  betreffen,  aber  auch  ökonomische, 
betriebliche,  gesellschaftliche  und  politische  Ziele  sowie  die  Zahl  der beteiligten 
Entscheidungsträger. Eine Integration dieser Theorien zu einem Modell für einen 
Konzern öffentlicher Unternehmen wird in diesem Beitrag versucht. 
 
Der  Konzern  ist  dreistufig  aufgebaut  (siehe  Abbildung  1).  Ein  öffentlicher 
Eigentümer bestimmt die Grundlagen der Unternehmenspolitik, indem er über die 
Höhe  des  gesamten  Investitionsbudgets  entscheidet.  Seine  grundlegende 
Unternehmenspolitik  ist  auf  das  Ziel  der  Machterhaltung  über  Wahlerfolge 
ausgerichtet. Ferner existiert eine Holding, die in unserer vereinfachten Modellwelt, 
die Investitionsbudgets Dj der Firmen j und damit die fixen Kosten Aj (sie gleichen 
KFj)  der  dem  Konzern  angehörigen  öffentlichen  Unternehmen  j  festlegt.  Die 
Tochterfirmen produzieren Güter Xj, welche an Abnehmer in Regionen j geliefert 
werden.  Somit  wird  der  Konzern  finanziell  koordiniert.  Die  Wähler  ihrerseits 
reagieren  auf  Leistungszunahmen  seitens  eines  öffentlichen  Unternehmens  j  in 
Region  j  zustimmend  positiv.  Allerdings  befürchten  sie  Nachteile  aus  hohen 
Investitionsbudgets, die finanziert werden müssen und zu deren Finanzierung D sie 
letztlich  beizutragen  haben.  Der  öffentliche  Eigentümer  berücksichtigt  diese 
Reaktionen bei der Festlegung des gesamten Investitionsbudgets. 
 
Die Unternehmen befinden sich an Standorten mit den Koordinaten s11 und s12 für 
Unternehmen 1 in Region 1 und mit den Koordinaten s21 und s22 für Unternehmen 2 
in Region 2. Die Firmen streben einen hohen Output und eine hohe Beschäftigung 
an. Eine Produktionsfunktion zeigt jeweils die Abhängigkeit zwischen dem Output 
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und  den  Investitionen,  d.h.  dem  Kapitaleinsatz,  dem  Arbeits-  und  dem 
Materialeinsatz  auf.  Der  Wert  des  Kapitaleinsatzes  entspricht  den  Investitionen 
(Fixkosten  als  Abschreibungen).  Sie  werden  vom  Eigentümer  finanziert.  Die 
variablen Kosten erwirtschaftet das öffentliche Unternehmen selbst. Der Lohnsatz 
differiert je nach Standort Es existiert eine Preisabsatzfunktion und das jeweilige 
öffentliche Unternehmen setzt seinen Preis selbst. Die Funktionen sind in Abbildung 
1 aufgeführt. 
 
Die  Maximierung  des  Nutzens  des  Unternehmensmanagements  bei 
Berücksichtigung  der  Selbstfinanzierungsanforderung  erlauben  die  folgenden 
Feststellungen  zur  optimalen  Standortwahl.  Die  Relation  der  Veränderungen  der 
standortabhängigen fixen Kosten bei Verschiebung des Standortes in Richtung1 und 
Richtung 2 gleichen der folgenden Relation. Es handelt sich um das Verhältnis aus 
der  Veränderung  des  Lohnsatzes  abzüglich  der  marginalen  Arbeitskosten 
multipliziert  mit  dem  Wertgrenzprodukts  bei  Verschiebung  des  Standortes  in 
Richtung  1  zur  Veränderung  des  Lohnsatzes  abzüglich  der  Veränderung  der 
Arbeitskosten  multipliziert  mit  dem  Wertgrenzprodukt  bei  Verschiebung  des 
Standortes in Richtung 2. Ferner gleicht das Verhältnis der Nutzenänderungen bei 
Verschiebung  des  Standortes  in  Richtung  1  und  Richtung  2  dem  Verhältnis  der 
Bruttogrenzgewinne bei diesen Verschiebungen. Die variablen Durchschnittskosten 
entsprechen dem Preis. Diese Aussagen gelten für beide Unternehmen. 
 
Die  Holdingfirma  koordiniert  die  beiden  Unternehmen,  indem  sie  das  gesamte 
Investitionsbudget D auf die beiden Unternehmen aufteilt ( D= Aj j=1
2 ∑ ). Der Nutzen 
der  Holding,  z.B.  die  Erreichung  ihrer  öffentlichen  Ziele,  ist  abhängig  von  den 
Outputs der Unternehmen 1 und 2. Obwohl die Parameter in den Gleichungen für 
die Holding nicht direkt von ihrem Standort abhängen wird der Nutzen der Holding 
über die standortwahlbedingten Änderungen des Outputs der Unternehmen 1 und 2 
beeinflusst. Für die Holding ergibt sich die günstigste Budgetaufteilung, wenn der 
Grenznutzen  der  Outputs  ausgelöst  von  Fixkostenänderungen  verbunden  mit  der 
Standortwahl für beide Unternehmen für die Holding gleich groß wird. 
 
Allerdings  wird  das  Gesamtbudget,  das  die  Holding  zuweisen  kann,  vom 
Wählerverhalten  in  den  Regionen  bestimmt,  da  der  Konzerneigner 
Wählerzustimmung  maximiert.  Die  Wähler  reagieren  zustimmend  und 
standortabhängig auf Erhöhungen der Ausbringungsmengen. Aber auch ablehnend 
und standortabhängig auf vermutete Finanzierungsbelastungen, die mit der Höhe des 
Gesamtbudgets verbunden sind. Aus der Maximierung der Wählerstimmen seitens 
des Eigentümers resultiert ein günstigstes Budget im Sinne des Konzerneigners. 
Das  Optimalbudget  wird  erreicht,  wenn  der  Zuwachs  an  outputabhängigen 
Stimmen der Abnahme an budgetabhängigen Stimmen gleicht. 
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Abbildung 1: Öffentlicher Konzern, Quelle: von den Autoren skizziert. 
 
Dieses Optimalbudget wird beeinflusst von den: 
•  Eigenheiten der Produktionen,  
•  Charakteristika der Nachfragefunktionen,  
•  Präferenzen  der  Nutzenfunktionen  des  Managements  der  öffentlichen 
Unternehmen und jener der Holding, 
•  Stimmenmaximierungswünschen des öffentlichen Eigentümers, 
•  Wählerwünschen und dem Wählerverhalten, 
•  Faktorpreisen und deren Standortabhängigkeit, 
•  Standortpräferenzen der Wähler und der Standortabhängigkeit der fixen Kosten 
der Unternehmen. 
 
Vj: Wähler in Region j =1  
 





Region 2  Region 1 





Unternehmen j (j=2), Nutzen-
funktion 
Uj = Lj · Xj              max 
Produktionsfunktion 
Xj1 = A1 (sj1, sj2) · C1 · Lj  mit 
Aj (sj1, sj2) = KFj = Dj  
Nachfragefunktion 
Pj = aj – bj · Xj = aj – bj · Aj · Lj · Cj  
 
Deckung der variablen Kosten 
wj (sj1, sj1) · Lj + i · Cj = Pj · Xj 
Unternehmen (1) (j=1), Nutzen-
funktion 
Uj = Lj · Xj             max 
Produktionsfunktion 
Xj1 = A1 (sj1, sj2) · C1 · Lj  mit 
Aj (sj1, sj2) = KFj = Dj  
Nachfragefunktion 
Pj = aj – bj · Xj = aj – bj · Aj · Lj · Cj  
 
Deckung der variablen Kosten 
wj (sj1, sj1) · Lj + i · Cj = Pj · Xj 165 
Die obigen Aussagen gelten, soweit wir nur die standortabhängigen fixen Kosten 
(Investitionen) betrachten, für Unternehmen1 und Unternehmen 2. Die marginalen 
Änderungen der Produktion und marginale Budgetänderungen gleichen sich in beide 
Richtungen  für  Unternehmen1.  Werden  die  Wählersensibilitäten  einbezogen,  so 
ändern  sich  die  Ergebnisse.  Die  Lösung  tendiert  zu  Standorten  mit  hoher 
Wählersensibilität. Falls sich nur das outputsensible Verhalten ändert, müssen die 
outputabhängigen Stimmenänderungen und solche aufgrund der Budgetänderungen 
plus solche aufgrund der marginalen Outputänderung in beiden Richtungen gleich 
groß sein. Wenn sich sowohl outputsensible als auch budgetsensible Verhalten 
ändern,  müssen  die  outputabhängigen  Stimmenänderungen  und  die 
budgetabhängigen  Stimmenänderungen  als  auch  die  marginalen 
Stimmenänderungen  aufgrund  der  Output-  und  der  Budgetvariation  in  beiden 
Richtungen gleich groß sein. Diese Ergebnisse gelten wiederum für Unternehmen 1 
und Unternehmen 2. 
 
Das Modell kann auch Konzerne einbeziehen, die teilweise unbeliebte Unternehmen 
aufweisen,  z.B.  Mülldeponien,  Atomend-  oder  -zwischenlager, 
Wasserschutzgebiete, oder solche, welche die Wähler gerne in ihrer Nähe haben, 
z.B. kulturelle Einrichtungen. In diesem Modell sind die angenommenen Funktionen 
well-behaved.  Falls  dies  nicht  der  Fall  ist,  etwa  Sprünge  in  den  Funktionen 
vorkommen oder nur diskrete Werte existieren, hat man nach guten Lösungen mit 
Hilfe  von Methoden des Operations-Research oder mit Hilfe von Heuristiken zu 
suchen.  Jedoch  ändern  sich  die  grundlegenden  Optimalbedingungen  nicht.  Erste 
Versuche  eine  Standorttheorie  für  öffentliche  Unternehmen  zu  entwickeln, 
wurden hier um ein Standortmodell für einen Konzern ergänzt. 
 
Dieses Modell kann in mehrfacher Hinsicht Erweiterungen erfahren: 
•  Weitere und verschiedene Unternehmen sowie differierende Konzerne können 
einbezogen werden. 
•  Weitere Konkurrenzaktionsparameter lassen sich einbeziehen, z.B. Lieferzeiten, 
Kreditierungen, Qualitäten, vorgeschriebene Tarifformen. 
•  Verschiedene  Marktformen  und  privat-öffentlicher  Wettbewerb  mögen 
Berücksichtigung finden, 
•  Die  Standortwahl  für  die  Holding,  z.B.  Abhängigkeiten  vom  Standort  des 
Eigentümers,  den  Entfernungen  zu  den  Tochterunternehmen, 
Beziehungsnetzwerke, ist noch zu modellieren..  
•  Verschiedene  Wahlfunktionen  für  Bundesstaatliche,  Länderwahlen  oder 
Gemeindewahlen  könnten  in  das  Modell  aufgenommen  werden  (Feig, 
Friedrich,  2002).  Die  Konkurrenz  zwischen  Eigentümern  (mehreren 
Bundesländer,  Gemeinden)  und  zwischen  zugehörigen  Unternehmen  bzw. 
Konzernen (z.B. Flughäfen, Opern) mag man einbeziehen. 
•  Verschiedene horizontale und vertikale Wettbewerbsmodelle die beispielsweise 
für regionale Investitionen in der VR China von Feig (2006) entwickelt worden 
sind, lassen sich mit dem Konzernmodell kombinieren. 
 
 